But now that I have talked about the most important of the
qualities mentioned above, I would like to discuss the others
briefly in this general manner: that the prince, as was noted
above, should concentrate upon avoiding those things which
make him hated and despised; and when he has avoided this, |
5 |
he will have carried out his duties and will find no danger
whatsoever in other vices. As I have said, what makes him
hated above all else is being rapacious and a usurper of the
property and the women of his subjects; he must refrain from
this; and in most cases, so long as you do not deprive them of |
10 |
either their property or their honour, the majority of men live
happily; and you have only to deal with the ambition of a few,
who can be restrained without difficulty and by many means.
What makes him despised is being considered changeable,
frivolous, effeminate, cowardly, irresolute; from these qualities |
15 |
a prince must guard himsetf as if from a reef, and he must
strive to make everyone recognize in his actions greatness,
spirit, dignity, and strength; and concerning the private affairs
of his subjects, he must insist that his decision be irrevocable;
and he should maintain himself in such a way that no man |
20 |
| could imagine that he can deceive or cheat him.
That prince who projects such an opinion of himself is
greatly esteemed; and it is difficult to conspire against a man
with such a reputation and difficult to attack him, provided that
he is understood to be of great merit and revered by his subjects |
25 |
For a prince should have two fears: one, internal, concerning
his subjects; the other, external, concering foreign powers.
From the latter he can defend himself by his good troops and
friends; and he will always have friends if he has good
troops; and internal affairs will always be stable when external |
30 |
affairs are stable, provided that they are not already disturbed
by a conspiracy; and even if external conditions change, if he is
properly organized and lives as I have said and does not lose
control of himself, he will always be able to withstand every
attack, just as I have said that Nabis the Spartan did. But concerning |
35 |
his subjects, when external affairs do not change, he has to fear
that they may conspire secretly: the prince secures himself from
this by avoiding being hated or despised and by keeping the
people satisfied with him; this is a necessary accomplishment,
as was treated above at length. And one of the most powerful |
40 |
remedies a prince has against conspiracies is not to be hated by
the masses; for a man who plans a conspiracy always believes
that he will satisfy the people by killing the prince; but when
he thinks he might anger them, he cannot work up the courage
to undertake such a deed; for the problems on the side of the |
45 |
conspirators are countless. And experience demonstrates that
there have been many conspiracies but few have been concluded
successfully; for anyone who conspires cannot be alone, nor can
he find companions expect from amongst those whom he
believes to be dissatisfied; and as soon as you have revealed your |
50 |
intention to one malcontent, you give him the means to make
himself content, since he can have everything he desires by
uncovering the plot; so much is this so that, seeing a sure gain
on the one hand and one doubtful and full of danger on the
other, if he is to maintain faith with you he has to be either an |
55 |
unusually good friend or a completely determined enemy of
the prince. And to treat the matter briefly, I say that on the
part of the conspirator there is nothing but fear, jealousy, and
the thought of punishment that terrifies him; but on the part
of the prince there is majesty of the principality, the laws, |
60 |
the defences of friends and the state to protect him; so that;
with the good will of the people added to all these things,
it is impossible for anyone to be so rash as to plot against him.
For, where usually a conspirator has to be afraid before he
executes his evil deed, in this case, he must be afraid even after |
65 |
the crime is performed, having the people as an enemy, nor can
he hope to find any refuge because of this.
One could cite countless examples on this subject; but I shall
be satisfied with only the one which occurred during the time
of our fathers. Messer Annibale Bentivogli, prince of Bologna |
70 |
and grandfather of the present Messer Annibale, was murdered
by the Canneschi family, who conspired against him; he left
behind no heir except Messer Giovanni, then only a baby.
As soon as this murder occurred, the people rose up and killed
all the Canneschi. This came about because of the good will |
75 |
that the house of the Bentivogli enjoyed in those days; this good
will was so great that with Annibale dead, and there being no
one of that family left in the city who could rule Bologna, the
Bolognese people, having heard that in Florence there was one
of the Bentivogli blood who was believed until that time to be |
80 |
the son of a blacksmith, went to Florence to find him, and they
gave him the control of that city; it was ruled by him until
Messer Giovanni became of age to rule.
I conclude, therefore, that a prince should not be too con-
cerned with conspiracies when the people are well disposed |
85 |
toward him; but when the populace is hostile and regards him
with hatred, he must fear everything and everyone. And well-
organized states and wise princes have, with great diligence,
taken care not to anger the nobles and to satisfy the common
people and keep them contented; for this is one of the most |
90 |
| important concerns that a prince has.
Among the kingdoms in our times that are well organized
and well governed is that of France: in it one finds countless
good institutions upon which depend the liberty and the
security of the king; of these the foremost is the parliament and |
95 |
its authority. For he who organized that kingdom, recognizing
the ambition of the nobles and their insolence, and being aware
of the necessity of keeping a bit in their mouths to hold them
back, on the one hand, while, on the other, knowing the
hatred, based upon fear, of the populace for the nobles, and |
100 |
wanting to reassure them, did not wish this to be the particular
obligation of the king. In order to relieve himself of the
difficulties he might incur from the nobles if he supported the
common people, and from the common people if he supported
the nobles, he established a third judicial body that might |
105 |
restrain the nobles and favour the masses without burdening
the king. There could be no better nor more prudent an
institution than this, nor could there be a better reason for the
safety of the king and the kingdom. From this one can extract
another notable observation: that princes must delegate distaste- |
110 |
ful tasks to others; pleasant ones they should keep for them-
selves. Again I conclude that a prince must respect the nobles
but not make himself hated by the common people.
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